STARTUPS AND INVESTORS AND TROLLS, OH MY!: HOW COMMERCIALIZATION PATENTS CAN BENEFIT STARTUP INNOVATION by Chou, Robert
Northwestern Journal of Technology and Intellectual Property 
Volume 17 Issue 3 Article 2 
5-2020 
STARTUPS AND INVESTORS AND TROLLS, OH MY!: HOW 
COMMERCIALIZATION PATENTS CAN BENEFIT STARTUP 
INNOVATION 
Robert Chou 
Northwestern Pritzker School of Law 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/njtip 
 Part of the Intellectual Property Law Commons, and the Technology and Innovation Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Robert Chou, STARTUPS AND INVESTORS AND TROLLS, OH MY!: HOW COMMERCIALIZATION PATENTS 
CAN BENEFIT STARTUP INNOVATION, 17 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 349 (2020). 
https://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/njtip/vol17/iss3/2 
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by Northwestern Pritzker School of Law Scholarly Commons. 
It has been accepted for inclusion in Northwestern Journal of Technology and Intellectual Property by an 
authorized editor of Northwestern Pritzker School of Law Scholarly Commons. 
STARTUPS AND INVESTORS AND TROLLS, OH MY!: HOW COMMERCIALIZATION 
PATENTS CAN BENEFIT STARTUP INNOVATION 
Cover Page Footnote 
Northwestern University Pritzker School of Law, J.D., 2020. I would like to give a special thanks to 
Professor Laura Pedraza-Fariña for her guidance through this writing process. 
This note is available in Northwestern Journal of Technology and Intellectual Property: 
https://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/njtip/vol17/iss3/2 
© 2020 by Robert Chou 
 
 
N O R T H W E S T E R N 
J O U R N A L  O F  T E C H N O L O G Y 
 A N D  




STARTUPS AND INVESTORS AND 
TROLLS, OH MY!: HOW 
COMMERCIALIZATION PATENTS 












May 2020  VOL. 17, NO. 3 
17:349 (2020) Startups and Investors and Trolls, Oh My! 
349 
STARTUPS AND INVESTORS AND TROLLS, OH 
MY!: HOW COMMERCIALIZATION PATENTS 
CAN BENEFIT STARTUP INNOVATION 
Robert Chou* 
 
ABSTRACT—Venture-backed startups play a crucial role in innovation and 
advancing our technology. However, the development of secondary markets 
for patents and the proliferation of patent assertion entities starting in the 
early twenty-first century has made the patent ecosystem a difficult 
environment for startups to navigate. Startups face challenges that their more 
established counterparts do not. First, startups must rely heavily on external 
sources of funding and, as a result, many decide to file for patents early in 
their lifecycle to signal their value to potential investors. Second, patent 
assertion entities threaten startups with patent infringement suits at a 
disproportionately high rate, which disrupts startups’ productivity and 
diverts their limited resources. This Note explores the “vicious patent cycle.” 
The cycle begins when startups file patents to signal worth. Then, when 90% 
of these startups fail, they leave behind patents that grow the “patent thicket” 
as well as opportunities for patent assertion entities to stifle innovation. 
Together, these negative externalities exacerbate the challenge of building a 
new company. Unfortunately, the United States patent system is not well 
suited to put an end to the cycle. Thus, this Note introduces a solution for 
startups: the small business commercialization patent. The small business 
commercialization patent is a modified form of the commercialization patent 
introduced by Ted Sichelman but is tailored to meet the unique needs of 
venture-backed startups. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Venture-backed technology companies (startups) produce significantly 
more influential inventions per investment dollar compared to established 
firms in the same industry.1 Startups are commonly associated with terms 
like “innovation,” “game-changing,” and “disruption.” It is easy to think 
these things about startups because we only hear about the successful ones. 
Companies such as Uber, Airbnb, and Slack are “unicorns,” representing 
only 1% of technology companies that raised seed-round capital.2 We do not 
often hear about failed startups because there is no such thing as a “startup 
death certificate,”3 so the estimated 90% of startups that fail do so quietly. 
If the goal of the patent system is to enable innovation and to facilitate 
the commercialization of novel products, then our current patent system is 
not doing its job, at least not for startups. Startups, like their more-established 
counterparts, are incentivized to acquire patents as a means to exclude 
competitors and reap the benefits of a limited monopoly. However, as a result 
of the startup industry’s business model, startups face unique challenges that 
larger technology companies do not. Specifically, startups face hurdles 
during venture capital (VC) fundraising and have a high rate of failure. As a 
result, startups are further incentivized to expend limited resources to obtain 
 
 * Northwestern University Pritzker School of Law, J.D., 2020. I would like to give a special thanks 
to Professor Laura Pedraza-Fariña for her guidance through this writing process. 
 1 David Benson & Rosemarie H. Ziedonis, Corporate Venture Capital as a Window on New 
Technologies: Implications for the Performance of Corporate Investors When Acquiring Startups, 20 
ORG. SCI. 329, 332 (2009). 
 2 Venture Capital Funnel Shows Odds Of Becoming A Unicorn Are About 1%, CB INSIGHTS (Sept. 
6, 2018), https://www.cbinsights.com/research/venture-capital-funnel-2/ [https://perma.cc/SB7C-53F7]. 
Seed-round capital is the first of several rounds of funding for a startup to become an established business. 
Carol M. Kopp, Seed Capital, INVESTOPEDIA (Apr. 16, 2019), 
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/s/seedcapital.asp [https://perma.cc/86F2-7AAA]. 
 3 CB INSIGHTS, supra note 2. 
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patents as a means to signal the value of their technology and inventiveness 
to potential investors or acquirers. Startups are also more susceptible to the 
looming threat of demands made by patent assertion entities (PAEs).4 
Startups that obtain patents experience a number of benefits, including 
increased growth in employment and sales over the following five-year 
period, as well as increased quantity and quality of subsequent patents 
granted.5 It is not surprising that the totality of these benefits are pushing 
one-third of startups to file a patent application at some point during their 
lifetime.6 This fact alone is not necessarily bad; however, given the current 
patent ecosystem, patenting startups can inadvertently contribute to the clog 
in the innovation pipeline. 
The broader literature7 has discussed the challenges faced by startups 
individually, but this Note brings them all together in what I refer to as the 
“vicious patent cycle.” This cycle, put simply, is a phenomenon where 
startups are incentivized to patent early to signal their value, but because 
nine-out-of-ten startups fail, many of these startups ultimately create 
negative externalities, e.g., adding to the “patent thicket”8 and selling patents 
to PAEs. In turn, the patent thicket and PAE portfolios grow, making it 
increasingly more difficult for startups to break into a technology space and 
remain operational. The cycle is inevitably a product of the patent ecosystem, 
and unfortunately, the current patent regime is not well suited to intervene. 
Left unchecked, the problems in the startup industry will continue to worsen 
as more and more patents are left unused or end up in the wrong hands. In 
response, I present a new type of patent called the small business 
 
 4 Robin Feldman & Evan Frondorf, Patent Demands and Initial Public Offerings, 19 STAN. TECH. 
L. REV. 52, 55 (2015). The terms “patent assertion entity,” “non-practicing entity,” and “patent troll” are 
often used synonymously, but at the end of the day, these terms refer to “any entity or individual whose 
core business involves licensing or litigating patents rather than making products.” Id. Patent demands 
are “letters indicating that the recipient may be infringing a patent and demanding a license fee, threats 
of litigation, or lawsuits.” Robin Feldman, Patent Demands & Startup Companies: The View from the 
Venture Capital Community, 16 YALE J.L. & TECH. 236, 238 n.2 (2014). 
 5 Joan Farre-Mensa, Deepak Hegde & Alexander Ljungqvist, What is a Patent Worth? Evidence from 
the U.S. Patent “Lottery”, 75 J. FIN. 639, 641 (2020). 
 6 Leonid Kravets, Do Patents Really Matter to Startups? New Data Reveals Shifting Habits, 
TECHCRUNCH (June 21, 2012), http://techcrunch.com/2012/06/21/do-patents-really-matter-to-startups-
new-data-reveals-shifting-habits/ [https://perma.cc/883Y-VFPB]. These numbers can be significantly 
higher depending on the specific industry. For example, patenting by startups, specifically in the software 
and biotechnology industries, is at least correlated with greater total number of financing rounds, greater 
total investment, and firm longevity. Ted Sichelman & Stuart J.H. Graham, Patenting by Entrepreneurs: 
An Empirical Study, 17 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 111, 122 (2010). 
 7 Colleen V. Chien, From Arms Race to Marketplace: The Complex Patent Ecosystem and Its 
Implications for the Patent System, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 297 (2010) [hereinafter Chien, From Arms Race]; 
Feldman & Frondorf, supra note 4. 
 8 “Patent thickets” are large groups of patents that block innovators from performing research, 
development, and commercialization. Sichelman & Graham, supra note 6, at 141. 
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commercialization patent (SBCP) as a solution to break the cycle. The SBCP 
uses the commercialization patent envisioned by Ted Sichelman9 as a starting 
point but further develops it to address the unique challenges faced by the 
startup industry. The SBCP, which grants its holder the affirmative right to 
make and sell the patented invention, would give startups a path to 
circumvent the patent thicket, while at the same time effectively disarming 
patent trolls. SBCPs would also act as effective signals of a startup’s value 
and provide investors with more certainty around their investments, which 
could lead to more investment activity. Overall, the SBCP has the potential 
to decrease the rate at which startups are failing. 
Startups are an important engine for innovation, and they deserve a 
more effective form of intellectual property protection. With the startup 
industry growing, and the outlook improving over previous years,10 startups 
will continue to play a vital role in pushing us through the twenty-first 
century. Thus, it is imperative that we create the type of ecosystem which 
allows startups to freely operate and focus on what they do best—innovate. 
I. THE PATENT ECOSYSTEM 
Before diving into the startup industry, it is important to understand the 
forces at play in today’s patent ecosystem. The twenty-first century patent 
ecosystem was largely shaped by three interrelated phenomena: the “patent 
arms race,” the patent marketplace, and the rise of PAEs. The patent arms 
race—the building up of a patent arsenal by technology companies—
exponentially increased the number of patents filed and granted, many of 
which were of lower quality and uncommercializable. The patent 
marketplace—a secondary market where patents are bought, sold, and 
traded—gave companies the opportunity to monetize their unused, lower-
quality patents.11 Through the marketplace, PAEs began to build their own 
patent portfolios, but with the goal of asserting them against practicing 
entities to extract settlement moneys and licensing royalties. In the following 
sections, I will provide some background on the patent arms race, the patent 
marketplace, and the rise of PAEs. However, as you read, keep in mind that 
these three phenomena are interrelated forces that developed concurrently in 
time. 
 
 9 Ted Sichelman, Commercializing Patents, 62 STAN. L. REV. 341 (2010). 
 10 2018 Startup Outlook US Report, SILICON VALLEY BANK, https://www.svb.com/trends-
insights/reports/startup-outlook/startups-enter-2018-with-confidence-about-innovation-economy/2018-
startup-outlook-report-us-report/ [https://perma.cc/6LQ4-2TEF]. 
 11 Chien, From Arms Race, supra note 7, at 303–04, 310, 339. 
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A. The Patent Arms Race 
The patent arms race was the exponential increase of defensive 
patenting12 activity by high-tech firms around the turn of the century.13 One 
of the earliest users of defensive patenting was Ford Motor Company which 
sought to reduce the risk of being sued and to obtain the freedom to operate 
within the automotive space.14 The more aggressive, modern-day practice of 
defensive patenting emerged as a result of a few individual companies. 
In the 1980s and 1990s, Texas Instruments and IBM amassed 
considerable patent portfolios and monetized them through licensing and 
litigation campaigns, “‘setting off . . . a chain reaction’ in the software 
industry and usher[ing] in a new era of software patenting and licensing.”15 
Companies that were on the receiving end of patent infringement lawsuits 
and cross-licensing programs began patenting anything and everything in an 
effort to develop their own patent arsenals.16 And thus began the patent arms 
race. Cross-licensing negotiations became a “stack-measuring contest” 
where the winner was determined solely on the quantity of patents as 
opposed to evaluating each patent for its substance.17 In a patent battle 
between Kodak and Polaroid, Kodak paid over $1.6 billion in damages and 
was forced to shut down its instant camera business at a cost of another $1.5 
billion. The settlement demonstrated the full extent of the risks and rewards 
that can flow from defensive patenting.18 
B. The Patent Marketplace 
While the patent arms race was raging on, another phenomenon was 
developing in the background: the patent marketplace (also referred to as 
“secondary markets”). The patent arms race led companies to acquire patents 
that “cover[ed] smaller, more incremental inventions, which [were] further 
removed from the company’s core operations and represent[ed] inventions 
with limited commercialization potential,” resulting in the accumulation of 
 
 12 “Defensive patenting” is the practice of filing patents in order to prevent others from entering a 
technology space, to obtain access to the technology of others through cross-licensing deals, and to 
neutralize patent infringement lawsuits. Id. at 308. While defensive patents do not offer any actual legal 
defense, they can be used to bring counterclaims in response to a patent infringement suit with the goal 
of both parties dropping the suit to end a stalemate. James M. Rice, The Defensive Patent Playbook, 30 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 725, 731 (2015). 
 13 Chien, From Arms Race, supra note 7, at 303–04. 
 14 Id. at 303. 
 15 Id. at 305–06. 
 16 Id. at 306. 
 17 Id. at 308. 
 18 Id. at 306–08. 
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“low-quality” patents.19 Not wanting to maintain a large number of these 
patents, companies looked to the patent marketplace as a means to dispose 
of them.20 Jerome Lemelson, an independent inventor, and Intellectual 
Ventures, a patent holding company, earned massive sums of money by 
asserting, rather than commercializing, the patents they acquired, which 
raised awareness of the opportunities offered by the patent marketplace.21 
The proliferation of PAEs in the 2000s created a new class of active buyers 
eager to follow in the footsteps of Lemelson and Intellectual Ventures.22 
Since the 2000s, NPEs have collectively purchased as much as 90% of the 
patents sold in public auctions, with a single entity, Intellectual Ventures, 
accounting for 75%.23 With the supply of and demand for patents high, the 
marketplace continued to grow, maturing into the state it is in today. 
C. Rise of the Patent Assertion Entity 
PAEs are a subset of non-practicing entities (NPEs) which obtain 
patents without any intention to practice the patents or release them into the 
public domain.24 PAEs assert their patent portfolios through litigation or the 
threat of litigation against operating companies that are currently practicing 
or will in the future practice the patent being asserted.25 
PAE activity has grown substantially during the twenty-first century, 
especially over the past decade.26 In 2007, PAEs filed 25% of patent lawsuits, 
jumping to 60% in 2012.27 Their emergence followed in the wake of the dot-
com bubble-burst and dramatically altered the patent landscape.28 During the 
1990s and 2000s, tech startups accumulated patents as a means to secure 
venture capital funding and to prolong incubation periods.29 When the bubble 
burst in the early 2000s, failed startups and other tech companies auctioned 
off their patents in secondary markets.30 PAEs that acquired these patents 
 
 19 Id. at 339. 
 20 Id. at 313–14. 
 21 Id. at 311–13. 
 22 Id. at 311. 
 23 Id. at 314. 
 24 Kristin Garr, IP Protection for Startups: The Role of Legislation in Stopping Patent Trolls and 
Encouraging Innovation, B.C. INTELL. PROP. & TECH. F., Aug. 30, 2018, at 1, 4, http://bciptf.org/wp-
content/uploads/2018/08/Kristin-Garr-S18.pdf [https://perma.cc/J4KE-RSML]. 
 25 Id. 
 26 FED. TRADE COMM’N, PATENT ASSERTION ENTITY ACTIVITY: AN FTC STUDY 55 (2016), 
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/patent-assertion-entity-activity-ftc-
study/p131203_patent_assertion_entity_activity_an_ftc_study_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/R633-DQN4]. 
 27 Feldman, supra note 4, at 238. 
 28 Rice, supra note 12, at 737. 
 29 Id. at 738. 
 30 Id. 
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would then use them to threaten patent infringement litigation against 
productive companies.31 PAEs predominately assert weak claims through 
“nuisance suits,”32 and by exploiting the high cost of litigation and 
defendants’ desire to settle as quickly as possible, they can force licensing 
agreements or monetary settlements.33 
II. STARTUPS ARE INCENTIVIZED TO PATENT IN THE FACE OF UNIQUE 
CHALLENGES 
An estimated 90 to 95% of startups fail, with a majority of them doing 
so after their fourth year when investors cease funding.34 Shikhar Ghosh 
conducted a study of 2,000 companies that received at least $1 million in 
venture funding between 2004 and 2010.35 He found that 75% of venture-
backed companies never returned cash to their investors, with 30 to 40% of 
them liquidating their assets and investors losing everything.36 There are 
many reasons why a startup fails, but the reason that tends to appear at the 
top of the list is running out of money.37 Thus, startups are incentivized to 
patent early as a means of signaling their value to potential investors, in 
hopes of securing additional funding or to attract potential acquirers. 
A. Venture Capital Fundraising Incentivizes Patenting for Signaling 
Purposes 
Startups are incentivized to patent early to increase their access to 
funding.38 The “signaling theory” of patent law suggests that patents play an 
important role in signaling the value of a firm’s technology and 
inventiveness.39 Patents are considered effective signals in the context of 
 
 31 Chien, From Arms Race, supra note 7, at 312. 
 32 Rice, supra note 12, at 738. 
 33 Id. at 739. 
 34 Deborah Gage, The Venture Capital Secret: 3 Out of 4 Start-Ups Fail, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 20, 
2012, 12:01 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10000872396390443720204578004980476429190 
[https://perma.cc/FYQ8-LKAH]. 
 35 Id. 
 36 Id. 
 37 The Top 20 Reasons Startups Fail, CB INSIGHTS (Nov. 6, 2019), 
https://www.cbinsights.com/research/startup-failure-reasons-top/ 
[https://perma.cc/2D2Y-NL6W]. 
 38 See Bronwyn H. Hall, Is There a Role for Patents in the Financing of New Innovative Firms?, 28 
INDUS. & CORP. CHANGE 657, 670 (2019). 
 39 Sichelman & Graham, supra note 6, at 113; see Clarisa Long, Patent Signals, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 
625, 653 (2002) (positing patents may be used to signal quality of a start-up); see also Mark Lemley, 
Reconceiving Patents in the Age of Venture Capital, 4 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 137, 143–44 (2000) 
(discussing patents’ increasing use as financing tools with the advent of VC financing and VCs’ “love-
hate relationship” with patents). 
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startup financing because they reduce the information asymmetry between 
investors and entrepreneurs by conveying three pieces of important 
information.40 First, a patent’s specification and claims reveal a wealth of 
information that is otherwise unobtainable: how to make and use the 
invention, the best mode of practicing the invention, and how the invention 
is novel and nonobvious.41 Second, because patents are relatively costly for 
startups, they signal positive attributes about the startup that are difficult to 
mimic by firms without such positive attributes.42 Third, as a result of the 
patent application and review process, information contained in patents tends 
to be credible, which reduces investors’ verification costs.43 
In practice, patenting positively correlates to certain firm characteristics 
and it plays a valuable signaling role in the early stages of a startup. The 
number of patents a firm owns has been correlated to a firm’s knowledge 
capital, productivity of R&D spending, innovativeness, and value.44 Several 
studies have reported these effects, especially among startup and early-stage 
companies seeking to use patents to attract financing events and to improve 
their chances of being acquired or going public.45 VCs view patents and 
patent applications as evidence that the firm is “well managed, is at a certain 
stage in development, and has defined and carved out a market niche.”46 
Patenting activity by startups is correlated to better performance and an 
increased likelihood of success.47 An empirical study examining VC-backed 
companies in the U.S. from 1976 through 2005 found that 31.5% of patenting 
startups were successful in completing an IPO, whereas only 7.2% of non-
patenting startups were so.48 Furthermore, only 5.6% of patenting startups, 
compared to 14.2% of non-patenting startups, filed for bankruptcy.49 
Additionally, startups with patents receive more investments and have longer 
incubation periods compared to startups that do not patent.50 
 
 40 Jerry Cao & Po-Hsuan Hsu, The Informational Role of Patents in Venture Capital Financing 1 
(June 8, 2011) (unpublished manuscript), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1678809 [https://perma.cc/LY9Y-
3YV4]. 
 41 Long, supra note 39, at 647. 
 42 Id. at 648. 
 43 Id. at 649. 
 44 Id. at 652. 
 45 Sichelman & Graham, supra note 6, at 113. 
 46 Mark A. Lemley, Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 1495, 1505–06 
(2001). 
 47 Cao & Hsu, supra note 40, at 3. 
 48 Id. 
 49 Id. 
 50 Id. at 9–10. 
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B. The Current Patent System Favors the Inventor Who Files First 
To make matters worse, the U.S. patent system not only permits 
inventors to file early, but it also incentivizes them to do so. The current 
patent laws do not require actual reduction to practice—the act of making 
the invention “exist in real space, and showing that it works.”51 Instead, the 
U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) allows inventions to be 
constructively reduced to practice when it meets the disclosure requirements 
in 35 U.S.C. § 112, which only requires that the inventor “adequately 
describe, enable, and convey the best mode of the invention[.]”52 The shift 
from actual to constructive reduction to practice effectively removed a 
barrier, e.g., having a working prototype, that previously prevented 
premature patenting.53 Furthermore, the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, 
which went into effect March 16, 2013, shifted the U.S. patent system from 
a “first-to-invent” to a “first-to-file” approach. The first-to-file system grants 
the patent to the inventor who races to the USPTO and files for the patent 
first, placing an even greater emphasis on patenting early compared to its 
first-to-invent predecessor. Issues with early patenting are further 
exacerbated by the tendency of the USPTO to grant patent claims that greatly 
exceed the scope of the patent’s disclosure, giving the patentee a broad 
exclusionary right and the ability to block inventions that are “far removed 
from the disclosed invention.”54 
III. STARTUPS ARE CREATING NEGATIVE EXTERNALITIES FOR 
INNOVATION 
There is no doubt that startups are pushing the envelope and have an 
overwhelmingly net positive effect on innovation. However, in their pursuit 
of innovation, startups can inadvertently create negative externalities that 
perpetuate the vicious patent cycle. It is important to understand what these 
negative externalities are and how they are created, so that their impact may 
be curtailed or avoided altogether. 
A. The Threat of PAEs and the Startup Industry 
PAEs are a major player in the vicious patent cycle and impact the 
startup industry. Startups are particularly susceptible to the threat of a patent 
lawsuit and PAEs are aware of this fact. A staggering 75% of defendants in 
 
 51 Christopher A. Cotropia, The Folly of Early Filing in Patent Law, 61 HASTINGS L.J. 65, 73 (2009). 
 52 Id.; see also 35 U.S.C. § 112(a) (2018). 
 53 Cotropia, supra note 51. 
 54 Sichelman, supra note 9, at 350. 
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PAE suits are privately held companies,55 and more than half of defendants 
make less than $10 million in revenue per year.56 As a comparison, startups 
make up only 16% of the defendants when the suing entity is operational, 
which leads to the inference that PAEs are selectively targeting startups at a 
disproportionately high rate.57 These statistics are corroborated by survey 
results revealing that 59% of VCs and 66% of startup companies reported 
that all or most of the patent demands they received come from “entities that 
license or litigate patents as their core activity.”58 Overall, 70 to 75% of VCs 
reported that PAEs have threatened litigation against one of their portfolio 
companies.59 
Startups, especially those in the early stages, are not equipped to deal 
with PAE demands for various reasons. For one, startups lack the necessary 
resources and experience to analyze patent validity or infringement claims 
within the context of a patent demand.60 Second, PAEs can often point to 
other firms that have settled on a similar demand, which creates precedent 
and adds a presumption of validity to their claim.61 Third, PAEs strategically 
target startups during critical phases in their lifecycle, e.g., prior to a funding 
event or an IPO, to force a quick settlement.62 Fourth, PAEs hold hundreds, 
if not thousands, of patents, compared to the handful of patents (if any) that 
a startup may have.63 Lastly, PAEs leverage the high cost of litigation to force 
smaller firms to choose the more rational and less costly option to settle 
outside of court.64 
Settle, fight, or do nothing—a startup is financially burdened by PAE 
demands no matter what they do. For example, the cost of defending against 
a patent demand ranged from $168,000 to $857,000, depending on whether 
the startup decided to fight inside or outside of the courtroom, and the cost 
of settling was an average of $340,000.65 Adding in the fact that the median 
seed-round deal size was $350,000, and half of startups never move past the 
 
 55 Nathaniel Borenstein, More Patent Trolls Are Targeting Startups. Here’s What You Can Do., 
ENTREPRENEUR (Apr. 10, 2018), https://www.entrepreneur.com/article/310648 [https://perma.cc/7DXP-
485Q]. 
 56 Colleen Chien, Startups and Patent Trolls, 17 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 461, 464 (2014) [hereinafter 
Chien, Startups and Patent Trolls]. 
 57 Id. 
 58 Feldman, supra note 4, at 242–43. 
 59 Id. 
 60 Neal S. Vickery, Don’t Forget About the Little Guys: Trolls, Startups, and Fee Shifting, 13 COLO. 
TECH. L.J. 171, 177–78 (2015). 
 61 Id. at 178. 
 62 Id. 
 63 Chien, Startups and Patent Trolls, supra note 56, at 466. 
 64 Borenstein, supra note 55. 
 65 Chien, Startups and Patent Trolls, supra note 56, at 465. 
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seed stage,66 the following inference can be drawn: settling the average 
demand from a PAE, which is $340,000, is almost enough to bankrupt half 
of the startups that raised seed-round funding. Fast-forward to the second-
quarter of 2018, the average and median size of seed-stage deals was 
$600,000.67 Even with the growth of VC deals, at least half of startups would 
lose over half of their seed funding when settling a patent demand.68 
PAEs’ demands have other undesirable side-effects, such as negatively 
impacting the productivity of startups and deterring potential investors. 
Colleen Chien’s survey of seventy-nine startups that had received a patent 
demand revealed that 40% experienced a significant impact which resulted 
in outcomes such as a business strategy pivot, a product change, or a delay 
in hiring or meeting operational milestones.69 Patent demands also hurt 
startups indirectly by signaling a risky investment to investors. In a study 
conducted by Robin Feldman, every VC surveyed indicated that the mere 
presence of a patent demand on a startup could potentially be a deterrent in 
deciding whether to invest in that company.70 About half of the respondents 
indicated that it would be a major deterrent on its face, and the other half 
indicated that their decision to invest would depend on the particular 
circumstances.71 After all, “no one wants to invest in a company where . . . 
investor money is going to be ‘bled to patent trolls.’”72 PAEs are a serious 
threat to startups because they have the potential of shutting them down with 
one fell swoop. At a minimum, a looming patent demand is a distraction that 
diverts limited resources away from productive activities, such as R&D, and 
creates a drain on innovation.73 
B. The Vicious Patent Cycle 
Once issued a patent, there are multiple ways in which a startup can 
monetize it. The most obvious is to commercialize the patented invention 
under the benefits of a limited monopoly. Less conventional methods for 
patent monetization include selling patents to third parties and asserting 
 
 66 CB INSIGHTS, supra note 2. 
 67 Jason D. Rowley, Inside The Global Q2 2018 Venture Market: New Records and Titanic Late-
Stage Rounds, CRUNCHBASE NEWS (July 9, 2018), https://news.crunchbase.com/news/inside-the-
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 68 This analysis uses litigation and settlement costs from 2014, so the results are likely conservative 
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 69 Chien, Startups and Patent Trolls, supra note 56, at 474. 
 70 Feldman, supra note 4, at 243. 
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 73 See id. 
NORTHWESTERN JOURNAL OF TECHNOLOGY AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY  
360 
patents against other practicing entities (or, in other words, behaving as a 
“patent troll”). In either scenario, patents which were initially acquired for 
signaling purposes later become weapons used offensively against other 
practicing entities.74 
Startups, like their more-established counterparts, are active in 
secondary markets.75 Secondary markets offer small and medium-sized 
companies the ability to “license, license and sell back, securitize or sell their 
patents” when no other options for liquidity are available.76 According to 
Chien’s survey of Acacia and Intellectual Ventures, less than 15% of the 
patentees profiled on their websites were connected to practicing entities.77 
This finding suggests that a significant portion of PAE patent portfolios were 
acquired from “distressed corporations” and “failed corporations.”78 For a 
failed startup, a patent asset may offer residual value to investors and a means 
through which they can recoup their investment.79 A study of 285 failed 
startups in the software, semiconductor, and medical device industries 
between 1998 and 2008 revealed that nearly 70% of the issued patents were 
sold on secondary markets within five years of an exit.80 A large majority of 
the 1,766 total patents sold were acquired by operating companies and 
approximately 10% were bought by non-practicing entities.81 Recent data 
revealed that among the top ten buyers, NPEs bought nearly 75% of the 
2,810 patents sold during the third-quarter of 2018.82 
A once hopeful startup may, for a multitude of reasons, forego its 
original plan to commercialize a product and instead behave like a patent 
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troll. As discussed earlier, inventors are incentivized to file for patents early 
in the invention cycle, which results in uncommercializable patents. 
Christopher Cotropia theorizes that because the cost of commercialization is 
so high, and the likelihood of success is uncertain, the holder of an 
uncommercializable patent is likely to take the lower-cost option of asserting 
the patent.83 There are also fewer risks with litigation, the only downsides 
being having to pay attorney’s fees and the possibility of invalidating a patent 
with little commercial value to begin with.84 The advantages with pursuing 
the patent troll route “prompts more patent holders to exercise their patent 
options by asserting the patent in litigation as opposed to commercializing.”85 
In reality, only 0.1% and 0.6% of patent litigations between 2000 and 2015 
were filed by pre-product startups and failed startups, respectively.86 While 
this route of patent monetization appears to be less prevalent, it is 
nonetheless creating a tax on innovation. 
IV. A SOLUTION FOR STARTUPS 
In this section, I will introduce the concept of a commercialization 
patent, as envisioned by Ted Sichelman, and highlight its benefits to the 
startup industry. Then, I will propose a modified form of the 
commercialization patent, the small business commercialization patent 
(SBCP),  and illustrate how it could be the ideal form of intellectual property 
protection for startups. 
A. The Commercialization Patent 
An issue with the current patent system is that it rewards the inventor 
who is quick to file but not necessarily the best commercializer. Ultimately, 
this leads to a reality where less than half of all patented inventions in the 
U.S. are commercialized.87 If the goal of the patent system is to spur 
innovation and create new technologies, then there seems to be a gap 
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between acquiring patents and commercializing the technology disclosed 
within them. The current startup business model encourages inventors to file 
for patents early. As a result, an invention is usually not at a point where it 
is market-ready and its commercial success continues to remain highly 
uncertain.88 To commercialize a product past the point of merely obtaining a 
patent, startups must take on additional costs and risks to transform the 
invention into a viable product.89 
Ted Sichelman proposed the concept of a commercialization patent, 
which is a patent granted in exchange for a commitment to commercialize a 
novel product.90 Unlike traditional patents, commercialization patent claims 
are limited to the product disclosed in the specification (including substantial 
equivalents), which cures the issue—generally associated with traditional 
patents—where filing early can result in a disparity between what is 
disclosed in the patent and what is embodied in the final invention.91 
To properly spur the productivity envisioned by Sichelman, the patent 
grants its holder the affirmative right to make and sell the product in addition 
to the “negative right to exclude others from making and selling the same” 
or a substantially equivalent product.92 The affirmative right is a key 
difference that distinguishes commercialization patents from traditional 
patents. Without the affirmative right, commercialization patents fail to offer 
any advantages over traditional patents. However, the affirmative right is not 
infinite, as it only grants immunity to injunctive relief.93 Traditional patent 
holders can still seek remedy in the form of “low, but fairly reasonable, fixed 
royalt[ies].”94 To further mitigate some of the harsh consequences of granting 
an affirmative right, Sichelman suggests that a commercialization patent can 
only be filed after a traditional patent goes uncommercialized for a period of 
three years after issuance.95 This period of time, which I will refer to as the 
“grace period,” is intended to provide sufficient lead-time and a strong 
incentive for a traditional patent holder to commercialize the invention as 
quickly as possible.96 
Commercialization patents could be beneficial to the startup industry 
for two reasons. First, commercialization patents would remove the threat 
and uncertainty of high-cost litigation, leaving PAEs with only one remedy 
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in the form of a low, fixed royalty. Second, compared to traditional patents, 
commercialization patents would act as stronger signals of the value of a 
startup, which may result in more investments and higher dollar amounts per 
investment. 
B. Commercialization Patents Would Effectively Disarm Patent Assertion 
Entities 
Even in the post eBay world, the threat of litigation continues to exist, 
though it has been curtailed.97 The threat of a patent demand continues to 
exist because permanent injunctions are not entirely off the table as courts 
still “may grant such relief.”98 In 2013, two-thirds of all permanent injunction 
requests were granted, which was down from nearly 100% prior to eBay.99 
PAEs, specifically, were granted permanent injunctions 16% of the time.100 
While this number is lower, it proves that eBay was not a complete solution 
to the threat of PAEs. In certain industries, e.g., biotechnology, the granting 
of permanent injunctions is certain, which suggests that things may not have 
changed at all for biotechnology startups.101 What’s more, the Supreme Court 
did not offer any guidance on how to apply the four-factor test, so courts 
have applied it differently, leading to inconsistent results across districts.102 
As a result, this could lead PAEs to forum shop for districts that are more 
likely to rule in their favor, which may diminish some of the good created by 
eBay.103 
As noted earlier, a commercialization patent grants its holder an 
affirmative right to practice the invention and immunity to permanent 
injunctions. With the implementation of a reasonably low, fixed royalty as 
the only remedy, commercialization patent holders no longer have to fear the 
threat of litigation. The trade-off for such immunity is losing a small 
percentage, e.g., 1–2%, of future revenue.104 However, because of the time-
bound limitations of the commercialization patent, startups will continue to 
be vulnerable to patent demands during the three-year grace period 
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associated with traditional patents. Keeping in mind that the grace period 
starts at the point of the patent’s issuance, PAEs may not have much runway 
to assert their patents because they acquire their patents second-hand, after 
the clock has started ticking. 
C. Commercialization Patents Can Lead to More Investments and Larger 
Investment Amounts in the Startup Industry 
A commercialization patent would have the added benefit of serving as 
a strong signal of a startup’s value and potential for success. The primary 
reason investors decide to forego investing in novel technologies is the “high 
level of risk and uncertainty involved in developing and marketing such 
innovations. . . .”105 A study conducted by Stephen Kiebzak et al. estimated 
that VC investment in new technologies and startups would have been $21 
billion higher between the years 2008 and 2012 had it not been for patent 
litigation brought by frequent litigators, or in other words, PAEs.106 
Furthermore, the fixed royalty proposed by Sichelman would grant a 
great deal of predictability. The inherent uncertainty in the current regime 
can lead to added transactional costs during patent disputes, such as costs 
associated with determining the boundaries of patent claims and the 
valuation of novel technologies not yet on the market.107 Furthermore, 
opportunistic behavior of PAEs results in higher royalties rates, which 
reduces the chance of startups making enough profits to attract investors.108 
Commercialization patents with a pre-determined, fixed remedy would 
eliminate the need for strategic negotiations and the bargaining of licensing 
terms. Investors would be able to account for the cost of the fixed royalty 
and factor it into their investment decisions like any other operating expense. 
Thus, reducing any risks associated with the startup industry could lead to 
favorable outcomes during fundraising. 
D. The Small Business Commercialization Patent is a Tailored Solution 
for the Startup Industry 
In this section, I will introduce the SBCP, a modified version of the 
commercialization patent which is tailored to the startup industry and 
entrepreneurs. Specifically, I will discuss the “small business” threshold, the 
“exclusivity period,” and transferability of the SBCP. The goal of the SBCP 
is to further innovation, while preventing abuses of the system and the 
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creation of negative externalities. With the right balance of parameters, 
SBCPs could be a viable solution. 
1. The Small Business Threshold 
First and foremost, the SBCP is intended to incentivize startups and 
entrepreneurs to commercialize novel inventions under the protection of a 
short-term duopoly. However, without limitations, large, well-established 
companies might take advantage of the system and eliminate its potential 
benefits. Thus, I propose implementing a small business threshold as a 
requirement for the grant of a SBCP. The guidelines for what constitutes 
small business should be prescribed by the USPTO and could include any of 
several parameters such as revenue, number of employees, number of 
funding rounds, value of the business, or age of the business.109 Such a 
requirement would ensure that only startups and other small businesses are 
able to enjoy the benefits of the affirmative right. 
2. Re-thinking the Negative Right 
It makes sense that the SBCP should come with some form of an 
exclusive right because without one, there would be less of an incentive to 
pursue a patent in the first place. However, the negative right contemplated 
by Sichelman may not be the best solution if the goal is to bring more novel 
products to the public in the most efficient manner possible. The negative 
right proposed by Sichelman allows the holder of a commercialization patent 
to prevent others from making and selling the same or a substantially similar 
product.110 After this term expires, the patent holder loses its right to exclude 
others but can continue in its affirmative right to make and sell the product.111 
Even with a shorter-term negative right compared with utility patents, the 
commercialization patent can still lead to clogs in the innovation pipeline by 
rewarding the patent to an inefficient commercializer and prolonging the 
timeline for the product reaching the market. 
Instead, I propose an exclusivity period reminiscent of the 180 days of 
market exclusivity given to generic drug manufacturers that succeeds in 
paragraph IV Hatch-Waxman litigation.112 Under the Hatch-Waxman Act, 
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the first generic drug company that succeeds in filing a paragraph IV 
certification, challenging the validity or claiming the non-infringement of a 
listed patent, is given 180 days of market exclusivity to compete with the 
patent holder before other generic drug companies can enter the market.113 
Following on this model, the exclusivity period for SBCP would be rewarded 
to the first startup that files for a SBCP after the grace period for a utility 
patent has lapsed. If granted, the startup would be given a set period during 
which the USPTO would not approve follow-on SBCP applications for the 
same product. In effect, the exclusivity period provides the first-mover 
commercializer with the advantage of getting short-term exclusivity on 
commercialization activities before losing the ability to block direct 
competition from other startups. 
However, the exclusivity period would not prevent the holder of the 
original patent to compete with the first-mover. In actuality, this may 
incentivize the original patent holder to either make efforts to commercialize 
the invention themselves or license their rights to someone who is committed 
to commercializing it. After the SBCP exclusivity period ends, other 
commercializers would then be able to apply for a SBCP for the same 
product and compete directly with the first-mover. It is reasonable and 
expected that multiple commercializers will hold a SBCP for the same or a 
substantially similar product. This would lead to the best outcome for 
consumers, as multiple patent holders would be racing to the market first. 
Ultimately, this system rewards the most efficient and committed 
commercializer with first-to-market competitive advantages, such as brand 
recognition and consumer loyalty.114 Follow-on commercializations would 
then compete with the first-mover in the open market, which would drive the 
demand for more innovative, higher quality, and lower cost versions of the 
product. The duration of the exclusivity period still needs to be defined. Too 
short of an exclusivity period may not incentivize startups to pursue this 
route of intellectual property protection in the first place. On the other hand, 
too long of an exclusivity period runs the risk of the situation where the 
SBCP is granted to an inefficient commercializer (or a bad actor), which 
would delay the invention’s commercialization. 
3. Transferability of SBCPs During an Exit 
For the subset of startups intending to stay operational, 
commercialization patents would guarantee a higher rate of success as a 
result of having the affirmative right to practice the invention and a limited 
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right to exclude competitors. For those seeking an exit through acquisition 
or sale of the patented invention, a SBCP could be a valuable asset to 
potential acquirers. A large firm whose goal through acquisition is to 
commercialize the startup’s technology, would gain the benefit of a clear 
path to market. However, for the acquirer to capture the full benefit of 
SBCPs, both the patent itself and its associated rights must be transferrable 
with the technology. 
The affirmative right associated with the SBCP would continue 
indefinitely throughout the life of the invention in the hands of the acquirer. 
With respect to the exclusivity period, there are two possible outcomes. If 
the exclusivity period, at the time of transferring the patent, had already 
expired, then the patent in the hands of the acquirer grants no exclusivity 
period. However, if the exclusivity period, at the time of transferring the 
patent, had not expired, then the clock should continue running in the hands 
of the acquirer after transfer. This is a reasonable outcome because the 
startup had realized a marketplace advantage during the time in which it 
previously held the patent and excluded competition. Presumably, this 
marketplace advantage was transferred to the acquirer upon transfer of the 
patent, so it follows that the amount of time counting towards the expiry of 
the exclusivity period should also be transferred. 
Permitting such transfer of the SBCP could lead to favorable outcomes 
for consumers. Large companies, which are arguably better commercializers 
than startups, would further accelerate the entry of new products in the 
marketplace. 
CONCLUSION 
While the small business commercialization patent has the potential to 
stimulate innovation in the startup industry, there are still some details that 
would need to be further defined. For example, the SBCP patent claims 
would be limited to the specific product disclosed in the specification 
(including substantial equivalents). In implementing the SBCP, the USPTO 
should consider redefining the requirement of reduction to practice. 
However, if the requirement only necessitates constructive reduction to 
practice (the current regime), the patent system could potentially reward a 
SBCP to a commercializer who is not quite ready for market. This would 
create inefficiencies by delaying the commercialization of the product. On 
the other hand, if the requirement calls for a working prototype, it may be 
too onerous for startups in the early stages to satisfy, causing them to forego 
the potential benefits of the commercialization patent and instead opt for a 
utility patent. This raises another issue: while a startup is working towards a 
prototype—which may take years to achieve—it remains vulnerable to PAE 
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demands and without a signal to investors. One possible solution to bridge 
the gap is to establish a provisional application which is available to startups 
who have received a patent demand or are engaging with investors.115 In this 
way, the provisional application would act as a temporary defense 
mechanism and a showing of good faith.  
Another issue to consider is that the SBCP may create some 
administrative burdens as the USPTO would have to expend resources on 
additional activities, such as assessing whether applicants meet the reduction 
to practice requirement and monitoring the exclusivity period for all active 
patents. Presumably, these are issues that could be alleviated by increasing 
the cost of filing, as already contemplated by Sichelman.116 Increasing the 
filing fee could also have the desirable effect of screening out inventors who 
may not be as committed to commercializing the product, and who would 
otherwise create a clog in the system by taking an opportunity away from the 
best commercializer. 
Startups are an important engine for innovation in our society, and they 
face unique challenges that are not being addressed by our current patent 
regime. For the amount of innovation and novel products startups produce, 
they deserve a little more attention and care when it comes to intellectual 
property protection. The goal of this Note is not to solve the startup 
industry’s problem overnight, but rather to point it out and stimulate 
discussions for re-thinking patenting strategies and patent reform. 
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